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Note
Combating Joint Ventures in Suppression:
Taking Inventory of the Legal Arsenal
Daniel J. Iden
What happens to a technology suppressed? In the 1980s
and 1990s, Sony and Philips collaborated as key players in the
development of recordable and rewritable compact disc technology.1 The companies, however, had each individually developed
and patented a solution for encoding position information,
enabling a CD reader/writer to maintain proper positioning
while writing data to the disc.2 In order to promulgate a uniform set of recordable CD standards for the industry, the two
companies agreed to promote Philips’s analog method, on the
basis that it was more implementable than Sony’s digital encoding.3 Sony and Philips then authored a publication entitled
―Recordable CD Standard,‖ informally referred to as the
―Orange Book.‖4 The two jointly licensed the patents to manufacture Orange Book-compliant discs, yet still chose to include
Sony’s unused digital patent.5 Additionally, the license offered
to manufacturers included an agreement not to use Sony’s pa J.D. 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University. The author thanks Thomas Cotter for his helpful advice and
guidance; Will Stancil for his comments and methodical insight; and the staff
and editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their tireless attention to detail.
Above all, the author expresses gratitude to his family, friends, and Riley, who
collectively have endured more casual conversation on patents than anyone
undoubtedly should. Copyright © 2011 by Daniel J. Iden.
1. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Understanding CD-R & CD-RW: Physical, Logical and
File System Standards, OPTICAL STORAGE TECH. ASS’N, http://www.osta.org/
technology/cdqa2.htm ( last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (providing more specific information on the standards contained in the Orange Book).
5. Sheri Qualters, Full Federal Circuit Narrowly Applies Patent Misuse
Doctrine, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1202471475859.
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tent to compete with Philips’s technology nor to use it as a basis
for an alternative technology.6 Essentially, Sony and Philips, in
the course of a joint venture, decided to promote one patent,
while relegating the other to be an undeveloped and unexplored
alternative.
Technology suppression—purposefully withholding new
and potentially useful inventions from society—is intuitively
worrisome. Since an improvement or variation on another’s invention still requires the original inventor’s permission to be
used or sold,7 a patent on a pioneering technology likely
represents control of all its derivatives.8 For this reason, perhaps the law should fully encourage the development of these
budding scientific avenues. The grant of a patent, however,
comes with no affirmative obligation to use the technology; instead, the patentee is merely given the temporary right to prevent others from doing so.9 It seems difficult, then, to make
productive use obligatory while still respecting this fundamental tenet of patent law. Moreover, it is largely unresolved
whether a joint venture, like the one between Sony and Philips,
would result in different approaches than those suggested by
existing legal precedent.
Part I of this Note explores the history of antitrust law as
courts have applied it to patents, the development of the misuse doctrine, and an overview of patent damages and compulsory licenses. Part II addresses the strengths and shortcomings
of applying each of these approaches. Finally, Part III encourages the courts to embrace a reworking of patent remedies to
limit joint ventures in technology suppression, as the best of
several imperfect solutions. This Note proposes only awarding
damages to suppressed patent holders—taking advantage of
the information available in joint ventures—to best deter those
that harm society by stifling innovation and impeding
competition.

6. Id.; see also Princo, 616 F.3d at 1322–23 (outlining further details
about the package license agreement).
7. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining the
phenomenon of ―blocking patents‖).
8. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting that a
patent ―may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development‖).
9. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a) (2006).
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I. DEVELOPMENT AND DOCTRINE: AVAILABLE LEGAL
AVENUES
Several legal theories may be available to prevent joint
ventures from suppressing technology. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act forbids any contract in restraint of trade.10
This section may apply, though it would be subject to the flexible ―Rule of Reason,‖11 relying on courts to decide whether the
arrangement is more harmful to competition than helpful.12
Another avenue, the doctrine of patent misuse, allows an otherwise-infringer to invoke an affirmative defense: that the
holder has wrongly used a patent beyond its appropriate
scope.13 Alternatively, commentators have proposed an application of compulsory licensing for patents,14 where a court would
refuse to grant an injunction prohibiting the infringer’s use or
sale, but would instead force the patentee to accept some sort of
reasonable compensation arrangement from the infringer.15
A. PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: AN UNEASY BALANCE
There is an inherent tension between patent rights and antitrust law.16 Patent law derives from a constitutional authorization to grant inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries
for a limited time.17 This right compensates inventors for contributing to the public good, namely, in disclosing new and useful inventions.18 The Sherman Act, on the other hand, was designed to counteract monopolistic activities that became a

10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
11. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216
(2010).
12. See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
13. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) (quoting B. Braun Med.,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 ( Fed. Cir. 1997)).
14. E.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest
as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 397
(2002).
15. Id. at 434.
16. Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13
VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 1 (2008), http://www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue3/v13i3_a5-Feldman
.pdf [hereinafter Feldman, Patent and Antitrust].
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (―The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.‖).
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concern in the late 19th century.19 In the absence of reasonable
substitutes for a certain commodity, the holder of a monopoly—
whether under a lawful patent grant or otherwise—is able to
charge a higher price than would otherwise be feasible.20 It is
not hard to predict conflict between a system providing inventors with lawful monopolies and laws forbidding monopolization.
The Sherman Act’s first two sections outline unacceptable
anticompetitive behavior. The Act prohibits any monopolization—or attempt at monopolization—over any part of trade.21
Also forbidden is a contract, conspiracy, or combination to monopolize or otherwise restrain trade.22 Notably, the two violations each require a different level of proof: a conspiracy to restrain trade would likely be easier for a plaintiff to prove than a
monopolization over trade.23
Courts often apply the rule of reason to determine whether
anticompetitive behavior rises to the level of an antitrust violation.24 The rule of reason asks whether the actions at issue unduly restrict or obstruct trade.25 A showing of procompetitive
interests can usually overcome allegations of a violation.26 To
streamline the inquiry, courts have determined that some anticompetitive activity gives rise to a presumption of a Sherman

19. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492–93 (1940) (commenting on public concerns that ultimately served as a backdrop for the
Sherman Act).
20. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 436–37 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman, Insufficiency] (noting that in antitrust inquiries ―a firm must have market power in
order to create anticompetitive effects‖ while a patentee ―theoretically has
power over the market represented by those . . . interested‖).
21. 15 U.S.C § 2 (2006).
22. Id. § 1; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788
(1946) (―[Sections] 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act require proof of conspiracies
which are reciprocally distinguishable from and independent of each other although the objects of the conspiracies may partially overlap.‖).
23. See Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 788 (noting ―a conspiracy in restraint
of trade . . . may stop short of monopoly‖ but suggesting ―a conspiracy to monopolize‖ may not be satisfied by a ―restraint short of monopoly‖).
24. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
25. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (reiterating the rule of reason articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States as
determining whether an act unduly restrained trade).
26. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918) (observing approvingly that a policy at the Chicago Board of Trade ―helped to improve market conditions‖).
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Act violation.27 Examples of such conduct include price fixing,
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.28
Of particular relevance to patents is the notion of tying—that
is, the conditioning of the sale of one product on the purchase of
another (usually undesired) item.29
Patent holders may also create anticompetitive effects by
offering licenses only to selected collections of patents. Companies sometimes offer joint licenses for a certain group of patents, referred to as a patent pool or package license.30 Aggregating intellectual property rights in this way has benefits, the
most significant likely being the reduction in transaction
costs.31 A cross-licensing agreement among firms may also
promote collaboration, enabling technologies that may not otherwise be available.32 Patent pools, however, also enable collusion between firms and may foreclose competition, especially
when the pool’s use becomes foundational and widespread—
such as when it becomes an industry standard.33
In light of these dangers, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division considered the idea of declaring patent pools il-

27. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (―[T]here are
certain agreements or practices which . . . are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry . . . .‖).
28. Id. But see Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–37
(2006) (rejecting tying of patented products as a per se antitrust violation unless market power is shown).
29. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 31 (providing a definition of ―tying‖);
Sarita Frattaroli, Note, Dodging the Bullet Again: Microsoft III’s Reformulation of the Foremost Technological Tying Doctrine, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1909, 1910
(2010) (―Tying occurs when a seller requires a consumer to purchase a second
good in order to purchase the first good.‖). The Clayton Antitrust Act statutorily prohibits these arrangements, though courts have viewed the requirements
under this provision and the Sherman Act to be substantially the same. 15
U.S.C. § 14 (2006); see Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the
Patent Misuse Doctrine 3 n.17 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=161275 (noting the minority and majority views about substantive requirements for tying to be an antitrust violation).
30. David W. Van Etten, Note, Everyone in the Patent Pool: U.S. Philips
Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 241, 242
(2007).
31. See id. (―Package licenses promise transactional efficiency: it is easier,
quicker, and cheaper to conduct transactions with one pool containing multiple patents than it is to transact individual patents separately.‖).
32. See Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 540 (2006).
33. Id. at 542.

2011]

JOINT VENTURES IN SUPPRESSION

283

legal during the 1970s,34 but, eventually, the Department reversed course and instead touted the procompetitive benefits of
these arrangements.35 Acknowledging that patent pooling can
have benefits for competition,36 the Department of Justice gave
its blessing to a specific proposed package licensing arrangement, on the condition that the patent pool contained no patents that would otherwise compete against each other.37 Moreover, an independent expert would verify that the patent pool
contained no substitutable technologies—in other words, that
all the patents included were ―essential.‖38 This verification satisfied the Antitrust Division, and it suggested that if these
standards were met it would not prosecute the patent holder
for antitrust violations.39 Presumably, any patent pool that
meets these requirements would likewise be safe from government prosecution, though private action would remain a
possibility.
Antitrust law, as it currently stands, would at best only be
moderately effective against technology suppression. With a
private plaintiff’s rule of reason-weighted burden and a governmental reluctance to prosecute, the law would have to counterbalance these to be an effective method of preventing technology suppression. There are other possible avenues of
combating suppression, however, which are exclusive to patent
law.
B. THE NEBULOUS DOCTRINE OF PATENT MISUSE
Another avenue available to deter joint ventures from engaging in technology suppression is the patent misuse doctrine.
Misuse, when employed as a term of art, is a defense to a patent infringement claim—stemming from the equitable doctrine

34. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 620 (1984).
35. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16,
1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.
36. See id. (referring to patent pooling as having ―competitive benefits‖).
37. Id.; see also Van Etten, supra note 30, at 246 (discussing the proposed
plan and the DOJ’s acceptance).
38. Van Etten, supra note 30, at 246; Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrard
R. Beeney, supra note 35.
39. See Letter from Joel I. Klein to Garrard R. Beeney, supra note 35
(―For these reasons, the Department is not presently inclined to initiate antitrust enforcement action against the conduct you have described.‖).
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of unclean hands40—available against a patentee who used her
patent in a way that is outside the scope of her granted rights,
with anticompetitive effect.41 While patent misuse will necessarily overlap with the realm of antitrust law, courts have reiterated that the fields are not precisely identical.42 The ambiguity surrounding the justifications and boundaries of the largely
court-made43 misuse doctrine has invited vigorous debate over
the role it should play.44 Patent misuse, shaped in large part by
courts, has some singular nuances owing to its equitable roots.
Recently, however, Congress has weighed in on the role the
doctrine should play in modern jurisprudence.
1. A Court-Created Doctrine
The early developments of patent misuse followed the contours of another doctrine: patent exhaustion. The patent exhaustion doctrine reflects the idea that a patentee is adequately compensated by the first sale of a patented product; the
owner may not continue to assert control over subsequent purchasers of the product.45 In Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the patent misuse doctrine’s
earliest roots, the Supreme Court held invalid an arrangement
in which the seller of a patented movie projector affixed a notice to its product, requiring the consumer and all future users
to use only the seller’s movies.46 In rejecting this restraint, the
Court noted that any additional control over a product ―cannot
be derived from or protected by the patent law, which allows a
grant only of the right to an exclusive use of the new and useful
discovery . . . and nothing more.‖47 It also disapprovingly characterized the patentee’s attempts to ―continue the pa40. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 ( Fed. Cir. 1998).
41. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) (citing Windsurfing Int’l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 ( Fed. Cir. 1986)).
42. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1372 (―Patent misuse is viewed
as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . . Thus misuse may arise when
the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.‖).
43. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329.
44. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 903 (2007)
(proposing a limited application); Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 20, at 402
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s current formulation); Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 1599, 1600 (1990) (declaring misuse redundant).
45. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2][a] (2011).
46. 243 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1917).
47. Id. at 513.
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tent . . . after it has expired‖ and ―create a monopoly . . . wholly
outside of the patent.‖48 The Court’s analysis addressing impermissibly expanding a patent’s scope solidified the framework for the development of the misuse doctrine.49
2. Peculiarities of Misuse
Patent misuse possesses several characteristics that distinguish it from antitrust and standard patent litigation. First,
a finding of patent misuse results only in the unenforceability
of the patent for as long as the patent holder’s wrongdoing
persists.50 Courts have specifically rejected the contention that
damages, instead of unenforceability, may be available to an
aggrieved party.51 In private enforcement of antitrust law, on
the other hand, a successful plaintiff can recover treble damages.52 The remedy for patent misuse also departs from general
patent law, where successful defenses result in invalidation,53
permanent unenforceability,54 or simply the escaping of liability.55 Because courts have little discretion in determining the
magnitude of an appropriate remedy, patent misuse is somewhat less flexible in creating disincentives for suppression.
The patent misuse doctrine also has a relaxed standing requirement, again distinguishing it from antitrust law.56 A defendant need not show that she was specifically injured by the
misuse,57 making it theoretically available to more patent defendants than antitrust would be to otherwise-plaintiffs.58 Ad48. Id. at 518.
49. See Cotter, supra note 44, at 907 (noting the origin of the patent misuse doctrine in case law).
50. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 19.04.
51. E.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 ( Fed.
Cir. 1997).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2006).
53. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (noting that failure to meet patent requirements results
in invalidity).
54. E.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 877 ( Fed. Cir. 1988).
55. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625
(2008) (reiterating ―initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all
patent rights,‖ meaning an infringer cannot be liable in damages). See generally CHISUM, supra note 45, § 19.01.
56. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942)
(holding that the plaintiff ’s conduct is disqualifying, ―regardless of whether
the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent‖).
57. See id.
58. Cotter, supra note 44, at 902.
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ditionally, some behaviors are considered per se indicators of
patent misuse, while the antitrust route would require a more
thorough proof of anticompetitive harm.59 Commentators have
noted—sometimes pejoratively—that patent misuse in some
cases can be antitrust ―on the cheap,‖60 since it costs less to
raise the misuse defense once already sued for antitrust than to
initiate a separate antitrust trial. Regardless of the merits of
these features, they are distinct elements of patent misuse, and
can offer both distinct advantages and drawbacks when applying the doctrine to technology suppression.
3. Congressional Reform
Five years after the patent misuse doctrine received notable criticism from Judge Richard Posner,61 the Senate drafted a
bill that would have codified his view.62 The Senate bill, following the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, would have brought
the proof required under a patent misuse defense into harmony
with established antitrust standards.63 Following some arguments that the Senate bill would be too rigid and broad,64 the
eventual 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act65 instead focused on
two types of agreements that Congress felt should not be subject to a strict per se presumption of illegality.66
First, the statute severely limits a court from finding misuse in the tying of one patented product to another.67 A court,
when investigating such an arrangement, must do so in ―view

59. See id. at 923 (suggesting that the agreement at issue in Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), would have been more difficult to prove under an
antitrust theory). This is not to say antitrust does not have its own per se
rules, but rather, that they are not coextensive.
60. Patent Hawk (Gary Odom), THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Aug. 30, 2010,
5:20 PM), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2010/08/misuse.html.
61. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–12 (7th Cir.
1982).
62. S. 438, 100th Cong. (1988).
63. See id.
64. See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 196–201 (1989) (reviewing the pertinent legislative history).
65. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676.
66. See Calkins, supra note 64, at 197.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006).
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of the circumstances,‖68 a fact-specific inquiry that has the
trappings of a rule of reason test imported from antitrust law.69
Second, the act declares that it is not patent misuse to
simply ―refuse[] to license or use any rights to the patent.‖70
Notably, however, the statutory phrasing appears only to protect single entities, not joint ventures.71 Regardless of their exact extent, however, the congressional reforms embodied in the
1988 Act undoubtedly prevented any further grand expansion
of misuse and sent a firm legislative message.72
C. REFORMING PATENT REMEDIES: MOVING PAST INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
Another method of attack against joint ventures in technology suppression could be a rethinking of patent remedies,
since this can alter the incentives that lead to their formation
in the first place. Patent remedies are specifically outlined in
the Patent Act.73 A court has wide discretion in determining
damages, and may award lost profits, reasonable royalties, or
some other measure of economic injury.74 Even after a jury decides on what constitutes just compensation to an aggrieved
party, a court has the freedom to amplify damages as much as
threefold.75 In addition to remedies traditionally available at
68. Id.
69. See Cotter, supra note 29 (noting how one court has read in a rule of
reason test, even though the Federal Circuit has not opined on the matter); see
also In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent and Contract Litig., 850 F. Supp.
769, 777 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (inferring a rule of reason approach from legislative
history).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
71. See id. § 271(d) (―No patent owner . . . shall be denied relief . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).
72. See Calkins, supra note 64, at 228 (speculating about the ramifications of the 1988 Act); see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d
1318, 1329–30 ( Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011)
(―Congress enacted section 271(d) not to broaden the doctrine of patent misuse, but to cabin it.‖).
73. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2006).
74. Id.; see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent
Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (noting how no version of the
Patent Act has offered specific guidance in the calculation of damages, leaving
courts to develop their own metrics).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 284. This increase, however, most commonly follows a
finding of either willful infringement or bad faith litigation. CHISUM, supra
note 45, § 20.03[4][ b]; see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 ( Fed.
Cir. 1996) (―Because increased damages are punitive, the requisite conduct for
imposing them must include some degree of culpability.‖).
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law, the Patent Act also provides for equitable relief in the form
of injunctions.76
1. Patent Damages: The Traditional Standard
Patent damages may better allow courts to craft appropriate remedies for infringement under widely varying circumstances, including when a defendant is infringing a suppressed
patent. For example, a court may award lost profits assuming a
patentee establishes causation between the infringing action
and a reduction in profitability.77 These can be a direct loss of
sales, decreased profits from the infringer’s adding to the market’s supply, or other injury.78 Moreover, a court can look to
noninfringing transactions to guide it.79 For example, if an infringed product is one which the patentee regularly licenses at
an established price, a court can simply substitute this value as
an estimate of lost profits from an infringing use.80
Alternatively, if lost profits are too difficult or vague to be
calculated accurately, the Patent Act permits a court to award
reasonable royalties.81 Courts often try to simulate what would
have happened at a hypothetical negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of infringement.82 In determining the appropriate amount for a reasonable royalty, the
trier of fact considers many factors.83

76. 35 U.S.C. § 283.
77. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.05.
78. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 10–11 (providing a list of injuries
courts have found acceptable to award lost profits).
79. See id. at 7.
80. See id. at 7–8 (noting that the law permits this substitution if several
factors are met).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3] (―The
courts developed the reasonable royalty measure as a means of providing a
just recovery to a patent owner who could not, for evidentiary or other reasons,
prove lost profits or an established royalty.‖).
82. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3][a].
83. Id. § 20.03[3][ b]. These factors were compiled in a federal district
court case, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d. Cir. 1971), which has received favorable treatment by the Federal Circuit, see Lucent Technologies v.
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 ( Fed. Cir. 2009) (―[T]he flexible analysis of
all applicable Georgia-Pacific factors provides a useful and legally-required
framework . . . .‖).
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2. Injunctive Relief Before and After eBay v. MercExchange
Preliminary injunctions are available to patent holders,
but the analysis is virtually the same as it would be under any
other legal theory.84 A more robust body of case law exists with
regard to permanent injunctions—which the Federal Circuit
has emphasized is usually the appropriate remedy.85
Although it appears that injunctions were almost automatically granted after a finding of patent infringement,86 an injunction would be inappropriate in some circumstances such as
when a patent term has already expired.87 Since the denial or
grant of a permanent injunction requires the consideration of
all the facts of a case, reviewed under a deferential standard,88
much of the guiding case law has developed in the district
courts.
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.,89 however, the Supreme Court clarified that there is some analysis required in
determining when an injunction is appropriate.90 Disapproving
of the Federal Circuit’s approach—basically, that patent law
somehow confers a presumptive right to an injunction91—the
Supreme Court in eBay reiterated that courts must proceed
with the traditional four-factor test:92
(1) that [the patent holder] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction.93

84. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.04[1]; see also High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551, 1554 ( Fed. Cir. 1995)
(―This court has made clear that the standards applied to the grant of preliminary injunctions are the same in patent cases as in other areas of the law.‖).
85. E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 ( Fed. Cir.
1989).
86. See id.
87. E.g., Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1549–51 ( Fed. Cir.
1994).
88. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1002 ( Fed. Cir.
1986).
89. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
90. See CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.04[2][ b] (―[T]he Supreme Court addressed the proper standard for granting a permanent injunction . . . .‖).
91. See Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31–32 (2009).
92. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006).
93. Id. at 391.
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Of note is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, appended to the
rather brief per curiam opinion, which advocates against injunctions granted for nonpracticing patentees.94 Such patent
holders—colloquially and pejoratively known as ―patent
trolls‖95—attempt to use the relative certainty of an injunction
to charge exceedingly high prices for a license.96 Since an injunction prohibiting the use of a company’s key product might
completely destroy a business, these ―trolls‖ might use the
threat of a near-automatic injunction to unfairly leverage presuit or settlement negotiations.97 Kennedy argues that in these
cases, legal damages would adequately compensate the aggrieved patentee.98 Interestingly enough, courts have adopted
an approach supported by Kennedy’s concurrence, denying
nonpracticing patentees injunctive relief and instead awarding
―ongoing royalties.‖99
In a 2002 article that predated the eBay decision, Kurt
Saunders argued for a consideration of public interest when
courts are determining whether or not to apply a compulsory
licensing regime.100 One of the categories Saunders targeted as
injurious to the public good is nonpracticing patentees who are
unwilling to license their intellectual property rights.101 PosteBay, this particular consideration seems to have found some
traction among courts, at least in effect.102 Saunders did not
advocate for a comprehensive adoption of compulsory licensing103 but observed that several statistical studies do not support the contention that a system would frustrate incentives for
invention and disclosure.104 Modifying the remedies available
to patent holders is one way to alter the environment that en94. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. See generally John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85
TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007) (illustrating the use of the term).
96. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 39– 40. These are interchangeably
referred to as ―compulsory licenses.‖ Id. at 39. But see Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13 ( Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining the Federal
Circuit’s rationale for distinguishing the two and preference for using ―ongoing
royalty‖).
100. Saunders, supra note 14, at 451.
101. Id. at 441.
102. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
103. See Saunders, supra note 14, at 451.
104. Id. at 439– 41. A goal of the patent system is to encourage invention
and disclosure. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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courages these technology-suppressing joint ventures to exist in
the first place.
These three broad areas of the law—antitrust law, patent
misuse, and patent damages—each offer separate advantages
and vulnerabilities to deter joint ventures from suppressing
technologies. This Note examines the problem of joint ventures
that suppress technology by attempting to merge it into existing doctrine. Because none of the existing avenues is an obvious
and clear fit, the inquiry is about which round hole can best accommodate joint suppression’s square peg.
II. WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES
In countering the social costs of technology suppression,
there are several legal avenues available. Applying a traditional and familiar antitrust analysis has the advantage of robust
case law and established doctrine, but the litigation is expensive, the burden of showing market power is difficult, and antitrust goals may be fundamentally misaligned with those of intellectual property.105 Alternatively, the patent misuse doctrine
may have an advantage in its ability to deter anticompetitive
behavior outside the bounds of the Sherman Act, but its potential for abuse by litigants and its lax standing requirement may
render it undesirable. Finally, compulsory licenses may find a
middle ground between a patentee’s intellectual property rights
and the public’s interest in technological development, but an
inherent conflict with patent law’s bundle of rights and the difficulty of managing conflicting incentives make workability unclear.
A. ANTITRUST: THE STATUS QUO IS NOT QUITE GOOD ENOUGH
Relying on an antitrust framework to deter technology
suppression offers some advantages, like its venerable history
and comprehensive court-made doctrine. It also presents some
formidable challenges, including tough standing requirements
and a potential to overemphasize only part of the effects stemming from those joint agreements.

105. It is necessary to clarify that when this Note proposes antitrust law as
a solution, it means to present antitrust as being the exclusive solution. The
other avenues are presented as alternatives supplementing existing antitrust
enforcement, and presumably providing better deterrence.
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1. Antitrust Law Is a Well-Developed Doctrine Applied
Frequently by Courts
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890,106 has enjoyed a long
history of scholarly analysis and regular use by litigants.107
One consequence of this history has been the development of a
robust court-created jurisprudence.108 For example, courts have
been applying the rule of reason for nearly one hundred
years.109
While the Act’s longevity alone does not necessarily suggest a better solution for solving the issue of technology suppression,110 the sheer length and frequency of considering the
issue points toward a more refined test.111 Indeed, commentators have noted the relative ―coheren[ce]‖ of antitrust law.112
The Supreme Court has also declared certain behavior per se
anticompetitive, often making judicial determinations easier.113
Detracting from the efficiency of these declarations, however, is
the fact that they are often slow to materialize.114 While courts

106. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
107. See, e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—Civil
Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month
Period Ending March 31, 2010, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ ( last visited
Oct. 14, 2010) (click on ―Statistics,‖; then click on ―Caseload Statistics 2010,‖;
then click on ―Table C-4‖) (showing that in 2010, for example, 1078 cases were
initiated in federal courts under antitrust laws).
108. See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFLCIO, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) (―In antitrust, the federal courts enjoy more
flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by
federal statute.‖); see also Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 87–89 (2010) (explaining the ambiguity in the statute
and the necessity for the courts to provide an analytical framework).
109. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
110. See DEANNA D. SELLNOW, CONFIDENT PUBLIC SPEAKING 394 (2d ed.
2005) (explaining the ―appeal to tradition‖ logical fallacy, i.e., the mistaken
belief that some method is superior just because it has been in practice for a
long time).
111. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
900–02 (2007) (noting that the Court has ―continued to temper, limit, or overrule‖ aspects of the doctrine).
112. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475,
476 (2011).
113. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
114. See Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 20, at 419 (observing that
courts generally use per se analysis only after observing that the behavior in
question is nearly always anticompetitive).
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have experience with joint ventures115 and unilateral technology suppression,116 an antitrust scrutiny of the combination of
the two might require lengthy judicial examination.
Moreover, patent misuse doctrine has been in development—though, granted, in flux—since the early part of the
twentieth century,117 and relying on antitrust for its history
alone does not confer an appreciable comparative advantage.
Though the courts’ history with antitrust provides an established framework,118 it is unlikely that familiarity with interpreting the Sherman Act is, by itself, a persuasive reason to
foreclose alternative approaches to preventing joint ventures
from suppressing technologies.
2. Antitrust Claims Have Important Limits on Litigants’
Ability To Sue
Optimally, to deter technology suppression by joint ventures, those injured should have the ability to bring suit. In antitrust law, a private plaintiff must overcome several difficult
hurdles in proving her case. The plaintiff must show both individual harm (standing) and anticompetitive effects to prevail.119
In the case of tying, though spared a full inquiry of anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason,120 a successful plaintiff
must instead show that the defendant possesses market power
in the relevant field.121
115. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1911)
(describing an agreement between more than seventy business entities).
116. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 –09 (2d Cir.
1981) (discussing Xerox’s unilateral refusal to use or license many of its patents); see also Gerald Sobel, The Antitrust Interface with Patents and Innovation: Acquisition of Patents and Grant-Backs, Non-Use, Fraud on the Patent
Office, Development of New Products and Joint Research, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
681, 683–89 (1984) (providing background for the SCM Corp. case).
117. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 479 (tracing back to the ―seminal‖
patent misuse case in 1917); see also supra notes 46– 49 and accompanying
text (discussing that case).
118. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 477 (arguing that ―antitrust law
provides courts with a well-developed set of rules by which to judge the complexities of effects on competition‖).
119. See Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885,
892 (D. Mass. 1980), aff ’d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) (explaining that
―[ p]atent misuse requires a lesser showing than a Sherman Act violation,‖ because proving individual harm and anticompetitive effects are not necessary).
120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (―[ I]n all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
market power in the tying product.‖).
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These showings become even more difficult for a plaintiff
suing a joint venture that is suppressing a technology.122 For
example, in terms of standing, the party—a licensee, current or
potential competitor, or even a member of the public—likely
will have a difficult time demonstrating individual harm.123
The alleged damages often will simply be too speculative to
prove an actionable injury.124 Perhaps this high bar to entry is
good, as it likely would prevent frivolous litigation. Since antitrust trials are infamously expensive,125 the threats of these
high costs could enable plaintiffs with attenuated connections
to coerce large settlements.126 The problem is, the individual
―injuries‖ that joint ventures in technology suppression tend to
cause are, indeed, more speculative and difficult to quantify:
the elimination of a firm’s chance to develop a technology into a
viable commercial alternative or the public’s chance to enjoy it.
Frustratingly, the advantages of antitrust litigation—keeping
out meritless claims—also serve to bar those plaintiffs that
would be aggrieved by a harmful joint venture suppressing
technology.
3. Antitrust May Overemphasize Procompetitive Effects
Antitrust law developed to maintain controls on the free
market.127 One could state the goal of antitrust jurisprudence
succinctly as ―competition.‖128 Likewise, intellectual property’s
oversimplified catchphrase would be ―innovation.‖129 Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of those aims illustrates a key problem

122. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1350 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (―The antitrust laws . . . provide no adequate remedy for the suppression of competition.‖), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011).
123. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 514 (noting a potential rival producer’s difficulty in showing a technology ―would have come to fruition and would
have become commercially successful but for the IP holder’s restraint‖).
124. See id.
125. Paul J. Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP.
L. REV. 949, 996–97 (2005). Stancil also discusses the overwhelming risks associated with antitrust litigation. Id.
126. Cf. Golden, supra note 95, at 2128–29 (making a similar argument for
the high costs of patent infringement defense).
127. EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.16 (2010); see
also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 108, at 75 (explaining how antitrust law has
been driven by evolving perceptions of economics).
128. See Bohannan, supra note 112, at 500 (referring to ―antitrust’s competitive ideal‖).
129. See id. at 499 (describing intellectual property law’s role as ―the engine of innovation‖).
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with cabining suppressive joint ventures within antitrust law:
its harm may lie largely outside of competitive concerns.130
Because an analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act would
be subject to a rule of reason inquiry, a court would look for
procompetitive effects to determine if the agreement is legal.131
Arrangements to suppress do often provide legitimate benefits
to the relevant market. For example, package licensing might
help to simplify the search of a potential licensee.132 If a party
needs ten different patents to make a certain product, a package license permits ―one stop shopping,‖ contributing to a more
efficient market.133 Since these effects invariably fall under a
rule of reason analysis, while the stifling of future innovation
may not,134 antitrust analysis would likely overemphasize the
former over the latter.135 Antitrust addresses some, but not all,
the concerns that joint ventures in technology suppression introduce.
B. PATENT MISUSE: THE CLUMSY ALTERNATIVE
Patent misuse is a frequently overlooked doctrine that
could be a powerful tool in combating suppression, particularly
because of its lax standing requirement. It is not clear, however, to what extent the doctrine can survive a substantial reinterpretation and a new application—being invoked to deter
joint ventures that suppress technology.
1. Misuse Is A Doctrine Embattled
Academically, judicially, and legislatively, the doctrine of
patent misuse is losing favor. Critics question whether there is
any persuasive justification for its existence.136 Alternatively, it
130. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1344 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (noting that an effect of suppression was that it
―preclud[ed] licensees from developing alternatives‖), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct.
2480 (2011).
131. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
132. Van Etten, supra note 30, at 243; see supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
133. See Van Etten, supra note 30, at 243 (explaining the necessity to contract with too many parties creates inefficiencies).
134. See Bohannan, supra note 112 (―[C]ase law has embraced an antitrust
standard for misuse, which may be coherent, but is less faithful to the core IP
values of promoting innovation and protecting access to the public domain.‖).
135. See id. at 479 (noting an antitrust approach would place ―too much
attention on market power in the patented . . . technology and too little on the
foreclosure of rival products or technologies‖).
136. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 29, at 21 (―The analysis presented above

296

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:278

is put forward as a workable tool, but not before being substantially reformulated.137 Meanwhile, in the courts, the doctrine
persists in sort of a fragmented double existence: the Federal
Circuit generally scrutinizing under an antitrust-inspired
standard,138 while both that court and the Supreme Court reiterate that at least some of patent misuse lies beyond the reach
of antitrust.139 The Federal Circuit en banc majority in a recent
case, however, seems to favor the demise of patent misuse, lamenting that the Supreme Court’s precedents on the doctrine
have not been overruled.140 Moreover, Congress has moved toward restricting misuse,141 suggesting perhaps a loss of confidence in its utility and hinting toward its ultimate elimination.
With courts and scholars alike struggling to justify patent
misuse’s modern role, it seems a stretch to reconstruct it for use
as a tool in combating joint ventures involving suppressed
technology. Such an application would require at least a significant reconstruction of the doctrine by the court. Moreover,
while a joint venture that refuses to license or use its patent
might not be protected from a finding of misuse,142 to interpret
§ 271(d) in this way seems, in a sense, disingenuous to the statute’s purpose and spirit.143 Even notwithstanding these objections, there is ambiguity whether the suppressed patent holder
calls into question the need for any patent misuse doctrine . . . .‖ (emphasis in
original)).
137. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 112, at 478 (―[M]isuse has been shooting at the wrong targets.‖).
138. See Cotter, supra note 29, at 4 –5 (commenting that the Federal Circuit uses a rule of reason test from antitrust when faced with behavior that is
neither legal nor illegal per se).
139. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969) (―[ I]t does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of . . . the Sherman Act . . . .‖); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 ( Fed. Cir. 1998) (―Patent misuse is viewed as a
broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . .‖).
140. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 n.2 ( Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011).
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (providing limits on misuse).
142. See id. (referring repeatedly to ―the patent owner‖). A joint venture
may not be safe under this provision because the nub of the harm is not simply
the refusal to license or use, as implicated under subdivision 5, but rather to
enter into an agreement to suppress a technology, regardless of market power.
See id.
143. Cf. Richard Calkins, supra note 64, at 228 (1989) (claiming that the
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act was one small step toward the goal of a more
laissez-faire market). Presumably, Congress wanted to limit the application of
misuse. See id. at 177 (―Congress started to restrict the rights of infringers to
assert misuse defenses . . . .‖).
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or the promoted patent holder (or both) is guilty of misuse. This
lack of clarity is perhaps demonstrative of the underlying problem: patent misuse is an ill-adapted tool for addressing suppressive joint ventures.
2. Lenient Standing Will Undermine the Legitimacy of Claims
A lax standing requirement is one of patent misuse’s most
striking features: a defendant need not show an injury resulting from the alleged wrongdoing.144 From a standpoint of optimal deterrence, one considers the factors that would best discourage the undesired suppressive behavior. In this respect,
patent misuse could theoretically be useful—in providing more
access to a greater number of parties by lowering the threshold
for consideration, the likelihood of addressing misconduct increases.145
Problems arise, however, because misuse may be prone to
overdeterrence. The standing requirements to bring a suit are
so lax that the fear of litigation or of being improperly sanctioned discourages legitimate patent uses.146 Imagine searching
for a certain person in a phonebook. Because phonebooks list
names alphabetically, one might search only the pages that
start with the same letter as of the person’s last name. The restriction of one’s search to only probable candidates is analogous to implementing a standing requirement. Conversely, if one
is not selective at all in determining how to search, there will
be a great deal of predictably incorrect listings through which
to pore. Additionally, the more pages one scans, the more likely
one is to make a mistake. In the context of patent misuse, the
lower threshold for standing may likewise increase the erroneous punishing of procompetitive acts.
Moreover, there is also no guarantee that applying patent
misuse for joint ventures in technology suppression—and
therefore, a lower standing requirement—would correlate with
increased deterrence of the sort of harm that really matters.
Misuse, for all its potential for increased access, sometimes al-

144. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
145. Cf. Cotter, supra note 29, at 5–9 (presenting the merits of, though ultimately rejecting, this argument).
146. See id. (―By doing away with any standing requirement and rendering
misused patents unenforceable in their entirety, misuse doctrine risks overdeterring procompetitive or neutral conduct that might be difficult to distinguish
from anticompetitive conduct.‖).
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lows access for the wrong reasons.147 For example, in Princo
Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Princo sought to
manufacture discs compliant with the Orange Book standard—
meaning they were interested in using the promoted patent,
not the suppressed patent.148 Subsequently, Princo stopped
paying the licensing fees for the patent pool.149 The crucial
question is if the law should provide a weapon to licensees who
are simply upset with their fee arrangements. Princo raised the
misuse defense, notwithstanding a lack of evidence that Princo
intended to develop or use the suppressed patent.150 Apparently, Princo was simply citing suppression as support for its claim
that Philips’s behavior was anticompetitive.151 Thus, while
Princo may have objected to the suppression of the patent’s development, it objected in name only—as it had no true interest
in using the technology.
C. REMEDY REFORM: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE
PATENTEE AND THE PUBLIC
To deter joint ventures that suppress a technology, courts
could look to limit the power that holders of suppressed patents
possess. If courts were to deny injunctive relief for nonpracticing patentees, and instead award damages only—in the form of
a compulsory license (alternatively known as reasonable or ongoing royalties)—it would likely represent a compromise between the interests of the patent owner and the public. It
would, however, provide an analytical challenge attempting to
discern the various incentives and equitable considerations involved in the application of such a scheme. Finally, it is unclear
whether denying equitable relief would be fundamentally incompatible with the tenets of the patent system.
1. Awarding Only Reasonable Royalties Is a Reasonable
Compromise
One of the most compelling reasons for courts to assign
compulsory licenses in cases of technology suppression is that it
147. At least, it allows access for reasons redundant in light of antitrust.
148. 616 F.3d 1318, 1323 ( Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct.
2480 (2011); see also supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
149. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1323.
150. Id.
151. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 15–16, Princo, 616 F.3d 1318 (No.
2007-1386) (arguing that the Lagadec patent was removed from price and
technological competition under a heading asserting ―anticompetitive effect‖).
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would make the patent available for public consumption and
development while still compensating the patentee.152 Yet, this
compromise does not represent a perfect middle ground, because it may harm the patentee.153 It is most likely that the patentee will be worse off, since encroaching on her absolute right
to exclude others (and, historically, receive an injunction)154 essentially reduces the value of the patent.155 This, however, may
be an unsympathetic argument when considered in the context
of nonpracticing patentees.156 Alternatively, one may perceive
the diminution in value as its redistribution to the public.157
Since others can develop or use the invention, the public is able
to reap any social good able to be derived from the patent.158
Thus, when the public is also considered, compulsory licenses
might represent a reasonable compromise among the patentee,
licensee, and the social good.
2. Developing a Workable Formula is Complicated
The complex relationship between parties in a joint venture gives rise to a difficult set of calculations for a remedial
compulsory licensing scheme. Moreover, the incentives created
by such a scheme become somewhat more unpredictable compared to unilateral suppression. First, the contractual relationship between the two parties in the joint ventures makes understanding the forced licensing more complicated. For
example, under this scheme, if a third party infringes a suppressed patent in a pool,159 a court would likely form an after-

152. See supra notes 17–1819 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.15 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed. 2009) (noting that in the efficient breach theory of contracts, the ideal
situation is where at least one party is made better off, and none worse off ).
154. See Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 33 (noting the general rule in the
Federal Circuit had been to nearly automatically grant injunctions).
155. See id. at 34 (―Without the right to obtain an injunction, the patentees’
right to exclude would be reduced to a fraction of its value, reducing the incentives for scientific and technological research.‖). See generally Einer Elhauge,
Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008) (discussing the tendencies
to underestimate the proper royalties for a patentee).
156. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
157. See Saunders, supra note 14, at 398 (―This . . . optimizes social welfare . . . through the patentee’s use or license to others.‖).
158. See id.
159. Patent pools are discussed supra, notes 30–33 and in accompanying
text.
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the-fact licensing agreement between the suppressed patent
owner and the infringer.160
Though copyright law also essentially does this in its compulsory licensing schemes, the context is quite different from
any that would render a similar approach workable in patent
law.161 One of the more straightforward provisions makes an
option available to copyright owners of musical works,162 where
they can be paid a statutorily set royalty by those wishing to
make or distribute the work.163 Patents, on the other hand, are
so varied in form and purpose that any attempt to create a uniform set of royalties would be futile. An appropriate amount for
a patent license would be unable to be determined in advance.
The possibility that a court could constructively create
nonexclusive licenses would make suppression agreements
much less attractive, since presumably nearly all of the agreement’s value to the pool is in the elimination of competition.164
Additionally, it is the possibility of obtaining an injunction that
can make a nonworked patent so valuable.165 While the actual
contribution from a patent might be financially miniscule, the
prospect of shutting down a product or business gives a nonworked patentee significant leverage.166
It is therefore necessary to consider exactly how troubling
joint ventures are, since taking away their primary value will
significantly curtail their formation. On the other hand, perhaps the consequences of forced licenses will be minimal because infringing firms face such a significant battle to compete.
Even given free rein to practice and develop a newly licensed
160. Indeed, the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to be between the infringer and the patent owner. CHISUM, supra note 45, § 20.03[3][a] n.4.
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006); see also id. §§ 111(c), 114(d)(2), 118 (making licensing agreements available for other copyrightable media).
162. Id. § 115(c)(1).
163. Id. § 115.
164. In Princo, Sony received thirty-six percent of the revenue from licensing the Orange Book CD-RW pool. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616
F.3d 1318, 1344 – 45 ( Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting). cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011). This was the case even though the Lagadec patent
provided no value to licensees, since they were forbidden to use it outside of
making Orange Book compliant discs (which did not use the Sony technology).
Id.
165. See Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement,
CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_
ntp/ (explaining how BlackBerry maker RIM and NTP, a patent holding company, reached an enormous settlement, because NTP could shut down RIM’s
use of a wireless email service, presumably through an injunction).
166. See id.
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patent, firms may decline to do so because the technology has
already been put at a disadvantage by the industry’s acceptance of the promoted standard.167 In that case, it is unclear
whether the remedial scheme would provide an adequate incentive for firms to attempt to unseat a joint venture sitting on
an unutilized technology. Overall, establishing any sort of compulsory licensing scheme would be difficult because of the complications involved in creating a formula that properly balances
all of the appropriate considerations.
3. Forced Licensing Is Not Fundamentally Inconsistent with
Patent Law
The right to exclude is one of the fundamental rights of the
patent system.168 Indeed, the Patent Act squarely addresses
this power.169 At first blush, a forced licensing regime seems to
be at odds with this. It is questionable, however, whether these
remedial schemes would truly frustrate the patent system, or
simply be contrary to tradition.
The United States is a party to the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
which explicitly allows for compulsory licensing arrangements.170 Countries have in fact considered and implemented
these schemes,171 presumably without causing devastating economic collapse. As with other doctrines in patent law,172 a practice that seems bizarre and fundamentally incompatible might
simply seem that way because of the history of the American
patent system.

167. See Van Etten, supra note 30, at 245 (observing that package licenses
can discourage other firms from investing in displacing the existing standard).
168. See, e.g., Venkatesan, supra note 91, at 33 (―Patent rights were not
created to give patentees the right to use the patented technologies, a right
they already had. A patent provides the right to exclude others, unconditionally.‖ (emphasis in original)).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
170. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. The TRIPS agreement
is not self-executing, however, and cannot be asserted in any claim or defense
except by the United States. In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 n.2 ( Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing 19 U.S.C § 3512(c)(1) (2000)).
171. Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 84.
172. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent
Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1303 (2003) (noting
the distinctive first-to-invent priority system that was used in U.S. patent law
as opposed to the rest of the world, which follows a first-to-file system).
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III. REMEDY RECONSTRUCTION: AN ACCEPTABLE
BALANCE
Finding a middle ground between the patentee and the
public is the most attractive solution. The public enjoys the
benefits of patents in use, while the patentee is justly compensated for her inventive investment. This would mean a court
should refuse an injunction and award only damages wherever
a joint venture’s patent is going unused and unlicensed. Because an agreement to share profits provides information on
the value of the suppressed patent, a court can better determine a fair license. This is so despite the inherent limitations of
a court’s analysis.
A. JOINT VENTURES PROVIDE COURTS WITH BETTER
INFORMATION
Courts examining joint ventures have a distinct advantage
over those looking into unilateral attempts to suppress technology, namely, there is often a negotiation that provides some insight into the firms’ assessment of the suppressed patent’s value. For example, in the Princo case that alleged anticompetitive
collusion between Philips and Sony, Sony received thirty-six
percent of the license fees from the package license, although it
only contributed one patent: a patent that was useless because
of the conditions of the license agreement.173 This sort of disproportionate arrangement could serve as an important indicator regarding the social harm—the anticompetitive harm—
generated by a patent’s suppression. Princo, in fact, raised this
argument in their reply brief.174 The en banc majority in Princo
did not comment on this fact, although the dissent expressed
surprise at the disproportionate rewards flowing to Sony.175
One can infer that the disparity between actual patent contribution and the share of compensation is likely related to how
well the parties believe the patent will compete. In other words,
the more consideration flowing to the suppressed patent holder,
the higher the likelihood the joint venture is suppressing a potentially viable product. Imagine two parties, in an artificially
simplified world,176 with two alternative technologies each in
173. See supra note 164.
174. Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 151 at 17–18.
175. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1344 – 45 ( Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting). cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011).
176. Some factors that are ignored here and should be considered are discussed infra.
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early development, A and A*. If they want to invest in, develop,
and license only one technology, and they can identify their respective chances of success beforehand, then the firms will likely bargain to an even split of the licensing revenue, with, say, A
promoted and A* suppressed. This is so because neither firm
would be willing to take less than fifty percent of licensing revenue, the expected value of the patents, before a winner is chosen. This is similar to betting on a coin flip with one dollar at
stake. The rational bargain is fifty cents to each party, since
neither party can determine the outcome ex ante. The problem
with this sort of agreement is that it can be the wrong choice
for the public good.
If A* turns out to have more social value, one could say A*
was wrongly suppressed. The public is injured by the firms’
choice to promote A and suppress A*. Though the firms made
the choice assuming the two technologies were of equal value,
the firms guessed wrong. If, instead, A and A* were allowed to
freely compete, A*’s superiority would eventually be discovered,
and the public would ultimately benefit.
To continue the coin analogy, this Part proposes inferring
something about the odds of the flip from the ex ante agreement
to split the prize. To that effect, this Note proposes that the
courts align the compulsory license price with the social harm
generated: the more disproportionate the agreement, the less
compensation a nonpracticing patentee should receive from an
infringer. Courts should implement this as a consideration in
calculating reasonable royalties, giving the judge a tool that is
more responsive to the unique facts of each case. Since holders
of potentially valuable suppressed patents in joint ventures
would receive reduced damages from infringement, this solution would help encourage technological development in lieu of
agreements to suppress.
This determination would happen in the context of a patent infringement suit, at the damages stage. First, a court
would make the threshold inquiry that there was a joint venture that suppressed the patent in question. Next, the court
would look at all the evidence, including any agreements between the parties. Finally, the court would take all this into
consideration while crafting an appropriate royalty arrangement.177 If the patent holder agreed to suppress A* for ten percent of A’s profits, a court would minimally discount any com177. For a discussion of other considerations in determining reasonable
royalties, see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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pulsory license, since the firms’ agreement suggests A* has limited ability to compete on its own. If, however, a patent holder
agreed to suppress A* for ninety percent of the A’s profits, a
court would severely discount any royalty paid to A*, because
the agreement indicates that A* would compete extremely well
against A.
The degree that this argument is persuasive depends on
whether the assumptions made were somewhat realistic: the
next section examines whether the inference claimed above is
at all practical in real world applications.
B. COURTS CAN LOOK TO AGREEMENTS DESPITE OTHER
REASONS FOR BARGAINING
Parties entering into a joint venture to promote one patent
and suppress another always lack information about the actual
marketability and future value of their respective patents. The
principle of capturing some of the future is one of the rationales
for several patent law doctrines.178 Moreover, it is not likely
that the two technologies will be perfectly substitutable. Still,
there are similar difficulties in determining reasonable royalties in the analysis courts use today, so this limitation puts
parties at least no worse off than under current approaches.179
Next, owners of a suppressed patent may have legitimate
reasons to accept a different price relative to its projected value. For example, a party might have no reasonable mechanism
in place for licensing a certain technology. In that case, the disadvantaged party would likely be willing to accept a diminished
share of the shared licensing revenue. Alternatively, one party
may have a significant interest in keeping the other’s patent
from being licensed or used, likely because of some threat to a
related good. Here, that party would be willing to pay a premium under a joint agreement to suppress.
Interestingly, these imperfections may in fact help determine a more ideal royalty. If it is beneficial to deter most
strongly the agreements that harm the public the most, and deter least those that cause little harm, perhaps an analysis of
the agreement can still provide useful indicators. For example,
if a firm is truly unprepared to license or use a patent on its
178. See CHISUM, supra note 45, § 16.02[1][a] (explaining blocking patents
and the doctrine of equivalents).
179. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 74, at 37– 4 0 (discussing the current
system of reasonable royalties, including the Georgia-Pacific Corp. factors discussed supra Part I.C.1).
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own, society suffers less harm, since the product may not have
made it into the market anyway. Since the firms would devalue
this patent, taking the shares of revenue into account would accurately find this sort of behavior less anticompetitive than it
otherwise would be. Likewise, a company fearing competition
on other fronts besides its substitutable patent will pay a premium, and this will result in an overestimation of the value of
the patent. This also makes sense: the firm paying the premium is denying the public access to a patent that it has understood to be valuable. Hence, it should invite greater deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Preventing joint ventures where one technology is promoted at the expense of another is a complicated and nuanced
problem. Primarily, these joint ventures harm society by withholding new and potentially useful inventions from the public.
In preventing others from improving on a technology, these
suppression joint ventures foreclose the unknown and stifle innovation. Following the contours of current legal regimes, rethinking remedies provides the best approach: a compromise
between the public and the patentee. Courts should be able to
use the additional evidence available in these ventures to better deter the formation of these suppressive joint ventures.
Moreover, awarding only damages—instead of injunctions—
balances the interests of the public in having use of a new invention, while still respecting the legitimate rights of the unused-patent holder. Ultimately, while not perfect, remedy
reform provides the best opportunity for courts to deter joint
ventures in technology suppression while not deviating too far
from existing legal doctrine.

